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Abstract

A seminal paper by Hamermesh and Soss modeled suicide as a rational economic decision based
on a comparison of the financial costs and benefits of staying alive. Their model is
fundamentally flawed and their prediction that suicide rates increase with age is wrong.

Keywords: suicides, health, depression, economic sociology
JEL: I12, I120, Z13

It is Time to Kill the Economic Theory of Suicide
In 1974 Hamermesh and Soss (HS) authored a seminal paper titled “An Economic Theory of
Suicide,” which applied a model of rational behavior to the seemingly irrational decision to
commit suicide. Over the years, HS has been cited by dozens of researchers studying suicides;
for example, Yang, Lester, and Yang (1992), Marcotte, (2003), Andrés (2006), Jalles and
Andresen (2015), Mann, and Metts (2017), Hasegawa, et al. (2018).
HS has even made it into the mainstream media, including a Freakonomics Radio episode
(Dubner 2016) about the rationality of suicide. Steven Levitt, the economist who co-authored
Freakonomics, won the 2003 John Bates Clark Medal, which is given to the leading American
economist under the age of 40 and is often a precursor to a Nobel Prize. Stephen Dubner, Levitt’s
Freakonomics co-author, hosts the Freakonomics Radio show and presumably goes over the
content, at least briefly, with Levitt.
On this episode, Dubner stated that,
Dan Hamermesh did what economists do. He wrote a model to determine the conditions
under which suicide might be considered a rational choice. He came up with three
predictions. Suicide, one, rises with age; two, falls as income increases; and three, falls if
your “desire to live” is high. Nothing so radical, but at the time, no one had tried
anything like this.
Then, Hamermesh plugged some suicide data from the World Health Organization
into his model. His predictions were right.
I will argue here that the HS theory is deeply flawed and one of its two main predictions is, in
fact, contradicted by the data.

Hamermesh and Soss
Back in the 1970s, when Hamermesh and Soss wrote their suicide paper, economists were overly
fond of mathematically tractable models in which completely rational people are certain of the
consequences of their actions and make decisions that maximize their utility.
We now know, thanks to the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982, 2000), among
others, that people are not fully rational. Humans make systematic mistakes—like anchoring and
the base-rate fallacy. We also now know that decisions are shaped by the fact that we live in a
world often defined by imperfect and asymmetric information; for example, Stiglitz (1974),
Stiglitz and Rothschild (1976). People are not completely rational and do not have perfect
information.
In the HS model, people are assumed to have perfect information about their futures and
make completely rational decisions. Specifically, individuals calculate the annual utility they will
derive from the prospective financial costs and benefits each year that they will live. These costs
and benefits depend on their age, permanent income (essentially their average annual income
over their lifetime), and the cost of staying alive. The only non-economic consideration is a
person’s “a taste for living,” which is a constant “defined for the cohort at birth.” When the
present value of a person’s discounted utility stream falls below zero, she makes the rational
decision to kill herself.
HS assume that as an individual ages, the cost of staying alive “at some minimal level of
subsistence” increases, while the discounted value of permanent income over one’s remaining
life expectancy falls, so that every year brings one closer to the breaking point. The model’s main
predictions are that suicide rates increase with age and are inversely related to permanent

income.
Theoretical Issues
The HS model is obviously incomplete in that it does not explain observed differences in suicide
rates by race and gender, nor does it explain why suicide rates are higher in developed countries
than in less-developed countries and why there are suicides in wealthy households. However,
there are even deeper, more fundamental problems with the model.
There is a grain of truth in the observation that some people, especially among the elderly,
find themselves in situations that are expensive, miserable and hopeless. Bed-ridden and wracked
by pain, they might decide that their quality of life is not worth the expense born by their
families to keep them alive.
But these are not the typical suicides. In California, for example, the median suicide age is 46
years old for white females and 41 years old for white males. How could an unemotional costbenefit analysis possibly lead to a rational decision by someone in their 20s or 30s to make an
irreversible decision to end one’s life? We can think of anecdotal cases, but surely these are not
typical. A model that cannot explain young suicides is clearly flawed, almost surely because it
attempts to impose a rational framework on what is generally an extremely emotional and often
impulsive decision—motivated, for example, by jealousy, hatred, humiliation, depression,
confusion, or substance abuse.
One flaw in the HS theory is the assumption that the suicide decision depends on a person’s
discounted value of future annual utility, with no consideration of the sequence in which those
utilities are received. Suppose that a 30-year-old male is looking forward to 50 years of positive
utility followed by 10 years of misery so extreme that the present value of lifetime utility is

negative. It is not rational, as the HS model assumes, for this person to commit suicide now
because he will be miserable 50 years from now. A fully rational calculation of annual utility
over one’s lifetime and the optimal time to commit suicide is far more complex than the HS
model and much too complicated for ordinary people to determine, particularly for young people
with decades of uncertainty ahead of them.
A second flaw is the assumption that the future is known with certainty. The future is almost
always uncertain in that our lives may go in many different directions, with some paths much
happier than others. People in their 20s do not know whether they will marry and who they will
marry (or, if married, whether they will divorce and possibly remarry), how many children they
will have, what their occupations will be, where they will live, how their investments will turn
out, how their health will hold up as they age. As their lives evolve, the number of possible paths
diminishes, but there will continue to be considerable uncertainty about what the future holds.
Few people can say with certainty whether they will be better or worse off 10, 20, or 30 years
from now than they are today.
A third flaw is the assumption that the costs and benefits of staying alive are fixed. People can
make choices that affect their lives throughout their lives. A decision to commit suicide is
irreversible; so it is not rational to cut off one’s options before seeing how one’s life evolves.
This argument is particularly compelling for the young, who can often make decisions that
improve their quality of life—find new jobs, hobbies, spouses, lovers, and other friends. It is far
more rational to change one’s life than to end one’s life. A young person would have to be
wretched beyond hope for it to be rational to decide that dying is unambiguously preferable to
living, with all the changes that are possible and all the options that are available. Young suicides

must be overwhelmingly irrational.
A fourth flaw involves aggregation issues. Even if it were true that an individual’s expected
lifetime utility marches inexorably towards suicidally low levels as one ages, the elderly do not
necessarily have the highest suicide rates. There is survivor bias in that some of the people who
are the most likely to commit suicide when they are old do so before they get old. Even if the
inclination for an individual to commit suicide increases as one ages, the number of people who
are on the margin may decline as some commit suicide. Those who do live long enough to
become elderly may be unusually happy or resilient, and have low suicide rates. For an extreme
example, suppose that every suicidal person’s life stops being worth living at age 70. There will
then be fewer suicides past 70 than at 70.
A fifth flaw in the HS theory is the assumption that the cost of staying alive universally
increases as one ages. This may be true for people who need expensive medical treatments, but,
for many people, the cost of living declines after the mortgage is paid off and the children leave
home. The Golden Years may be wishful thinking for some people, but it is a reality for others.
There is, in fact, evidence, that despite physical impairments, the elderly are, overall, the
happiest age group (for example, Cornwell, Laumann, and Schumm 2008, Yang 2008). One
study (Thomas et al. 2016) of adults between the ages of 20 and 100 concluded that mental
health increased linearly with age, with people between the ages of 20 and 30 having the highest
levels of stress, depression, and anxiety, and the elderly having the greatest satisfaction with life.
These data may well be tainted by survivor bias, but they do demonstrate that we should not
necessarily assume as do HS, that the elderly are the most miserable and the most tempted to
commit suicide.

Empirical Issues
The HS model predicts that suicide rates increase with age. They look at male suicide rates for
1965-1967 in 21 developed countries, with ages divided into six categories: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64, and 65-74. They find that the suicide rate rises monotonically with age category in
nine countries and that, in eight other countries, the suicide rate increases monotonically, but
peaks at age 55-64. They conclude that, “While the evidence presented in this table is by no
means conclusive, it does suggest that within a country there is a general tendency for suicide
rates to rise with age.”
These data neglect females completely and males over the age of 74. In addition, the grouping
of suicides into six age brackets conceals some interesting details.
The State of California’s Department of Finance (1998, 2009, 2012) has compiled intercensal
estimates of the state’s annual population by race, gender, and age (from 0 to 100 years old)
going back to 1970. The California Department of Health Services (1970-2004) has granted me
access to a mortality data base that identifies each decedent’s gender, race, date of birth, date of
death, and cause of death for the years 1970-2004.
I used these data to calculate the number of suicides and the suicide rate during this time
period by gender, race, and age. I calculated suicide rates for whites since this is the only race
with enough meaningful data, and combining all races might introduce confounding factors as
California’s racial population has changed over time.
As noted earlier, the median suicide age is 46 for white females and 41 for white males,
which is a serious challenge to the HS model in which suicide rates increase with age.
Figure 1 shows the suicide rates by age, for white Californians who died during the years

1970-2004. The drop in suicide rates for both elderly males and females may well reflect the
survivor bias mentioned earlier and reverses the conclusion HS reached when they looked at data
that end at age 74. The decline in male suicide rates between the ages of 25 and 65 also
contradicts the HS model and the HS data, which may have been muddled by the use of 10-year
age brackets. Female suicide rates are also inconsistent with the HS model, rising gradually
between the ages of 16 and 50 and then declining after the age of 50.
These detailed data on suicide rates for white males and females are overwhelmingly
inconsistent with the HS model’s prediction that suicide rates increase monotonically with age.
Discussion
Keynes (1936, 161-162) wrote of investment and consumer spending:
[A] large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather
than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most,
probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be
drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a
spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.
The same is no doubt true of our decisions to do something negative, including the extreme of
taking one’s own life. Some human decisions are not well modeled as a dispassionate
comparison of the mathematical expectation of quantifiable costs and benefits. Sometimes,
people make frankly inexplicable decisions driven by blissful ignorance, unbridled passion, or
unjustifiable fears—what Keynes called animal spirits. The fact that people often regret their
behavior is compelling evidence that their choices were more emotional than rational and that the

consequences were not taken into account fully. Unfortunately, the consequences of committing
suicide cannot be undone.
The attempt to model suicide as a rational decision based on an enumeration of the financial
costs and benefits of staying alive is an unconvincing attempt to explain the inexplicable, a
modeling exercise that can undermine the credibility of worthwhile economic analyses.
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Figure 1, Suicide Rate by Age, White Californians, 1970-2004

